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ABSTRACT
Context: Programmers frequently look for the code of previously
solved problems that they can adapt for their own problem.Despite
existing example code on the web, on sites like Stack Overflow,
cryptographic Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are com-
monly misused. There is little known about what makes examples
helpful for developers in using crypto APIs. Analogical problem
solving is a psychological theory that investigates how people use
known solutions to solve new problems. There is evidence that the
capacity to reason and solve novel problems a.k.a Fluid Intelligence (Gf )
and structurally and procedurally similar solutions support prob-
lem solving.Aim: Our goal is to understand whether similarity and
Gf also have an effect in the context of using cryptographic APIs
with the help of code examples.Method: We conducted a controlled
experiment with 76 student participants developing with or with-
out procedurally similar examples, one of two Java crypto libraries
and measured the Gf of the participants as well as the effect on us-
ability (effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction) and security bugs. Re-
sults: We observed a strong effect of code examples with a high pro-
cedural similarity on all dependent variables. Fluid intelligence Gf
had no effect. It also made no difference which library the partici-
pants used. Conclusions: Example code must be more highly simi-
lar to a concrete solution, not very abstract and generic to have a
positive effect in a development task.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Software security engineering;Us-
ability in security and privacy; Cryptography; • General and
reference → Empirical studies; • Human-centered computing
→ User studies; • Software and its engineering → Software li-
braries and repositories; Modules / packages.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Most software requires the use of cryptography for security pur-
poses. Developers, who commonly are no security experts, must
find out how to use cryptographyApplication Programming Interfaces (APIs)
in their code. Finding and learning from examples for the usage of
such APIs is one of the ways to make their programs work. Yet,
there is little known about what makes examples from the docu-
mentation or sites like Stack Overflow helpful for developers or
lead to misuse.
Such an approach falls under Analogical Problem Solving (APS)
[4] in psychology. There are three dimensions of similarity between
a target solution and a source analogy [3]: (1) Superficial similarity
is given if the source analogy shares common general attributes
like objects and characters. (2) Structural similarity is given if the
source analogy shares causal relations like the same solution prin-
ciple, the same obstacles, the same outcomeor the same resources. (3) Pro-
cedural similarity regards how similar the procedures and opera-
tional details are that are required to implement the solution. Hav-
ing only superficial similarity can lead to choosing unsuitable so-
lutions. Hence, structural and procedural similarity are needed to
support APS. Yet, not only the analogy itself is a factor but also
the capabilities of the developer who relies on analogies to solve
a problem. The most relevant capability is Fluid Intelligence (Gf )
– the ability to reason and solve novel problems – because of its
high correlation with analogical reasoning performance [7].
We designed a controlled experiment to test whether examples
with different similarity and Gf of developers have an influence on
the effectiveness, efficiency, satisfaction and created security bugs
of performing a Java development task involving a crypto library
done by novice programmers. Examples from CryptoExamples1 are
our benchmark and were given the experiment group in addition
to both groups being able to search the web for other examples. To
control for the influence of a specific crypto library, we included
Google Tink besides the Java Development Kit (JDK).
Acar et al. [1] conducted a controlled experiment with 256 Python
developers who had to perform various tasks involving symmetric
and asymmetric encryption. Their findings suggest that missing
documentation, code examples and other functionality let partici-
pants struggle with the APIs. Mindermann et al. [6] looked at the
usability of Rust cryptography APIs. They found that the crypto li-
brary designed to bemore usablewas slightly less usable for the ex-
periment participants. A major complaint by the participants was
missing documentation of and examples for the libraries. In sum-
mary, low-level APIs, problems with documentation and missing
examples are reasons for misuse.
1https://www.cryptoexamples.com/
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2 EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
We had two independent variables that we manipulated in the ex-
periment: The used cryptographic library (either JDK or Tink) and
the used examples (either CryptoExamples or other found exam-
ples). Additionally, we measured the independent variable Gf with
Bochumer Matritzentest (BOMAT) advanced short [5], a non-verbal
power-speed test.
The dependent variables are: The effectiveness (howmuch of the
task was completed until the time limit was reached), efficiency
(the time needed to to finish the task or, in case of not finishing
the complete task, 80 minutes) and the satisfaction (measured with
the System Usability Scale (SUS) [2]). Furthermore, we measured
the number of statically detectable security bugs in the final imple-
mentation.
The subjects of the experiment were 76 undergraduate students
of a course on the introduction to software engineering at the Uni-
versity of Stuttgart, Germany. Participants were assigned to the
following groups: (JO) Using the default crypto library of the JDK
and not receiving the crypto example code. (JM) Using the default
crypto library of the JDK and receiving the crypto example code.
(TO) Using the Tink crypto library and not receiving the crypto
example code. (TM) Using the Tink crypto library and receiving
the crypto example code.
The only experiment task was to encrypt a string using the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and decrypt it for the tam-
per verification afterwards. Important to note here is, that none of
the examples from the web (including CryptoExamples) could be
copied without substantial alteration to solve the task.
3 ANALYSIS
Effectiveness. We calculated the following mean effectiveness for
each group: EJO = 0.376, EJM = 0.836, ETO = 0.368 and ETM =
0.841. By comparing these values we could see a highly increased
effectiveness for the participants who used the provided examples.
Interestingly, Tink had a slightly worse effectiveness than the JDK
for the participants who did not get the code examples.
Efficiency. The groups had P JO = 0.298, P JM = 0.993, PTO =
0.348 and PTM = 1.287. There we could see a similar relation be-
tween the groups as previously for the effectiveness. In terms of
tasks per hour, participants were much more efficient on average
(269 %) with the provided examples. If we compare only group J
and T, Tink users were also much more efficient on average (65 %).
Satisfaction. A general average score on the SUS is said to be 68
which none of the experiment groups reached: S JO = 39.7, SJM =
58.1, STO = 46.6 and STM = 61.6. The values suggest that users
of Tink might be a little more satisfied with the library than users
of the JDK and that the provided examples seem to increase the
satisfaction as well and not only the effectiveness and efficiency.
Security Bugs. We found a mean number of security bugs of
SecJO = 3.28 and SecJM = 0.33. Most bugs (40) were about “cipher
with no integrity” followed by “Eletronic Codebook (ECB) mode
is insecure” (30), “cipher is susceptible to Padding Oracle” (7) and
“hard coded key” (4). All with high confidence and a rank of scary,
the highest one in SpotBugs.
In a regression analysis of all involved factors, we found a neg-
ligible influence of Gf with β values close to 0. Only the usage of
CrypotExamples showed statistically significant, large effects.
4 LIMITATIONS
Allowing the participants to use the web restricts our control on
what sources they use to help them in their tasks. Participants of
all groups could use the web and search for examples on the web,
including the experiment group. We see it as necessary, because it
is closer to development in a practical setting. Yet, it introduces the
threat that participants from the control group used examples with
a procedural similarity comparable to CryptoExamples (or Cryp-
toExamples directly). To mitigate this threat (1) we classified the
other viewed examples and compared them to the provided exam-
ples from CryptoExamples. (2) After the experiment, we reassigned
participants based on their activity log (if they found and used
CryptoExamples). During this discovery, we found no other used
example that has a comparable procedural similarity as CryptoEx-
amples. Differences in other categories, except for security, are not
as clear as for procedural similarity.
We used first and second year students with some programming
experience and little to no experience with cryptography. Hence,
we expect that the results can be generalized to other program-
ming beginners or even professionals new to using cryptography
libraries.
5 CONCLUSIONS
Our results suggests that providing analogical solution with high
procedural similarity can be an important factor for being effective,
efficient and satisfied in using cryptographic libraries while creat-
ing few security bugs. To our surprise, the effect of Gf was very
small. We see this positive, because it seems that successful usage
of the cryptographic libraries with the help of examples does not
depend on the Gf of the developers. This means that there is no
internal and stable factor that prevents developers from success-
ful use. Improving solution examples is probably much easier than
improving the fluid intelligence Gf of developers.
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